TURNING AN UNSUSTAINABLE COST CENTRE AROUND TOWARDS SUSTAINABILITY : MAY 11 2015

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDED STEPS TOWARDS TRANSLATING THE QVMAG FROM A COST CENTRE INTO A COMMUNITY SOCIAL ENTERPRISE 

Against the background discussed below there are a number steps that seem logical to apply as an alternative to continuing to fund the QVMAG as a Cost Centre as it has been for decades. In addition, these steps are offered as an alternative to the counterproductive and the often failed strictures of economic rationalism typically applied to operations when their sustainability is questioned. The proposed steps in summary are as follows.  

• In accord with the musingplace’s publicly articulated and revised purpose in a 21st C context, divine an operating cost centre budget in accord with recent history. 

• Ensure that the funding required can indeed be secured in a socially cum politically sustainable manner. 

• Set the target for year one of a longer term budget review process with the expectation that 10% of that year one budget must be realised through entrepreneurial activity, excluding grants for recurrent expenditure. Underwrite this mechanism via a GAL (Guarantee Against Loss) to provide a level of security for the operation in it transition from cost centre budgeting towards more entrepreneurial budget models. 

• Allow for any income achieved to be held in a ‘suspension cum carry-over account’ towards the next years recurrent budget and/or capital expenditure depending upon its source. 

• Review the year one outcome and set the year two recurrent budget accordingly. As a part of this review determine which parts of the recurrent budget are in fact project and program funding and which parts are to do with the recurrent maintenance of the operation. 

• Reset the institution’s Strategic Plan and report the review findings, including year one outcomes, directly to all the institution’s funding agencies, sponsors and donors. 

• Set the target for year two of the process with the expectation that 20% of that budget must be realised through entrepreneurial activity and underwrite it via a GAL and as for Step 4 allow for the carry over of appropriate generated income be carried forward.

• Review the year two outcomes towards setting the appropriate level for the operation’s sustainable recurrent budget and continuing level of program delivery. 

In accord with outcomes achieved, and the overall review process, reset the operation’s Strategic Planning process and the timeframes within which enterprise planning takes place. Likewise, as a part of this review, determine which parts of income coming in the form of grants can be sustained in the short, medium and long term and what aspects of the operation they can be directly related to grant income for research and program delivery. AND importantly, measure the outcomes achieved in previous two years and assess their effectiveness relative to targeted cultural development and cultural tourism objectives.

BACKGROUNDING

The QVMAG, like most public museums, is currently imagined as a Cost Centre. The argument goes “museums cannot make a profit … full stop.” It may or may not be so but it depends where you look and what you are looking for. In the ’business world’ a cost centre is that part of an organisation/operation that: 

• Does not produce a direct profit; and 
• Adds to the cost of running a company/operation – the Council in the QVMAG’s case. 

In the business world, examples would include research and development departments, the marketing office, the help desks, the customer service unit and the contact centre.

But Councils, Governments generally, are not businesses. They are monopolies set up to service a constituency. In essence, for their constituents, they are cost centres for them. By design nothing is done, or is intended to be done, for a fiscal profit. 

Constituents invest in their Councils by paying rates & fees, on the expectation that they will receive a set of services with tangible and intangible outcomes – often intangible dividends rather than a fiscal profit.

Although Cost Centres are not always demonstrably profitable, they are there to add value indirectly and/or fulfil some other corporate mandate. While research and development departments may deliver profitable outcomes, while effective public relations and customer service departments may build customer loyalty, in themselves these things are not profits but they do add value to an operation. 

Typically cost centres have a negative impact on the bottom line – at least superficially – they are normally first in line for rationalisation and cutbacks. Likewise, operational decisions are typically driven by cost considerations.

Investments in ‘Cost Centres’ – new technology and staff etc. – are typically difficult to justify in a profit driven organisation because their indirect profitability is difficult to translate into the bottom-line. 

Business’ metrics are employed to quantify the benefits of a Cost Centre and relate costs and benefits to those of the organisation as a whole. 

However, Councils are not businesses. Rather, they are service providers delivering, typically, services that in turn provide both tangible and intangible dividends. More to the point, their purpose is to ensure the amenity of place – and they are thus engaged in the ‘profession’ of placemaking in a not-for-profit context. 

Unproductive, lazy or ineffectual Councils are directly accountable to their constituencies but the functional ‘service providers’ are not – the public servants, officers, et al. They are cushioned from accountability and are often able to insulate themselves against uncomfortable scrutiny. 

Given that the assessment of the relative ‘quality and quantity’ of the services delivered and the amenity/value achieved, in effect, can only be done subjectively. 

In democratic governance models those assessments can only be done, effectively, at elections albeit other options may be available. Consequently, it is contingent upon the directly accountable ‘governors’ to hold their service providers truly accountable. 

The cost centre mantra, and its assumption that it cannot/shouldn’t generate a profit, and by extension says that a cost centre cannot/shouldn’t generate income either, is one dimensional and fundamentally flawed – an in all likelihood, self-serving in the laziness it affords. 

SURVIVAL MISTAKEN FOR SUCCESS 

Entrenched cost centres operate in accord with the MICAWBERprinciple, they can only survive and typically by design they can neither flourish nor succeed. Charles Dickens’ character’s, Mr. Micawber’s, dictum that goes "annual income twenty pounds, annual expenditure nineteen pounds nineteen and six, result happiness. Annual income twenty pounds, annual expenditure twenty pounds ought and six, result misery" comical as it is, it defines the one dimensionality of cost centres. 

MICAWBERprinciple accountancy counts beans but does not allow for them to be planted because that would present risks deemed to be unacceptable. The principle invokes the metaphor where an accountant counts the beans that are stored out of the reach of rats and insects but nonetheless they loose their viability because of the environment provided to ‘protect’ them. 

It follows that value is typically lost under the aegis of the MICAWBERprinciple or at the very least is diminished. It’s a metaphor for ‘unintelligent stewardship’ that fits the cost centre centrality of all too many musingplace imaginings all too well. Like Mr. Micawber, they teeter on the edge of fiscal disaster waiting for “something to turn up” – typically a philanthropic handout, or a benevolent government windfall or via some other ‘White Knight’. 

Public musingplaces’ MICAWBERprinciple accountancy is careless of its income sources and never more so than when ‘governors’ can be persuaded by their officers/servants to conscript the funding needed, and without recourse or real constraint, to build their bureaucratic empires and 'grow their pies'. By extension, the paradigm continually supplies bureaucratic overlords with underlings fully cognisant of the principles of Parkinson’s Law – "work expands so as to fill the time [and use the resources] available for its completion[and/or doing]."  

MUSINGPLACE SUCCESS 

Musingplaces can be successful rather than simply survive and never more so than when they add value to living in a community and the places where people live. How is that value measured? 

Euphemistically, one way to measure success is to count the proverbial “bums on seats” and invoke the metrics and then calculate the cost per bum. 

If it is the case that the more you spend, or the more you do, the more the numbers remain the same, then it is clear that value is not being delivered. Here a cost centre can only survive if its ‘funding agencies’ decide to look away for whatever reason. 

However, how can it realistically be expected that they will continue to look away? What is being put at risk by relying upon them doing so? If value, on the evidence, is not being delivered, how long can the agencies afford to look away and claim accountability is delivered upon? 

If musingplaces, as cost centres, are not delivering appropriate dividends, and the dividends, or the lack of them, are assessed externally and independently as adequate, then the case for their continued unsustainability grows. 

Accordingly, then it would seem that there are just two propositions in prospect: 

1. Close the operation down and reinvest in some alternative ‘value delivering’ project; or 
2. Reconfigure the operation in ways that value delivery is more likely to be delivered. 

WHAT MIGHT AN ALTERNATIVE LOOK LIKE? 

If the operation were imagined as a ‘value centre’ there would need to be a paradigm shift. The resulting metrics, as likely as not, would be required to demonstrate that the alternative was delivering more for less. By extension, this implies that new knowledge, and new skill sets, will need to be acquired – and change embraced with some enthusiasm. 

This is unlikely to be welcomed by those comfortably entrenched in a cost centre paradigm informed by the MICAWBERprinciple. Value won, rather than ‘profit earned’, may turn out to be more difficult to assess via metrics. However, the levels of income generated under an ENTERPRISEarchetype may well provide the justifying metrics to some extent. 

THE SEARCH FOR SUSTAINABILITY 

If in the search for a sustainable business/operational model for a museum you look at musingplaces in an international context there is surprising evidence that they can be sustainable. Internationally their sustainability is very often already reflected in their aspirations and programmes.  It might be imagined as being rare but it seems not. If you consider financial sustainability, then a topical issue in austere times is the competition for limited resources. 

Likewise, trying to find innovative ways of working better and at a reduced cost is nearly always the focus. One solution on offer for musingplaces is to "become a social enterprise". However, many museums have already learned that they need to be and are already operating a social cum community enterprise business model – and many are doing it really well. How and why? 

WHAT IS SOCIAL ENTERPRISE? 

An old definition of social enterprise was based on the notion that a social enterprise was a socially beneficial organisation that derived in excess of 70% of its income from trading. If this is applied to the charitable/voluntary sector it excludes them and denies them access to the large funding pools and support available to 'social enterprises' if it is rigidly applied. 

However, “social enterprise” needs an accurate definition that works in practice and that is not forever changing. It was always a political minefield and the debate lingers on even if it is around a much looser definition. The social enterprise idea is not new. 

Basically social enterprises are operations that engage in commercial activities in ways in which they are able to deliver social, environmental, educational or cultural outcomes. The profits, the income generated, is used to increase the level of value the operation can deliver rather than be retained for the personal gain of those who are employed in the enterprise. 

HOW CAN A MUSEUM BE A SOCIAL ENTERPRISE? 

The evidence is that musingplaces have demonstrated an impressive collection of income streams and cost saving measures that most 'not-for-profit organisations' can only dream of. 

Museums deliver on: 

• Government contracts and research grants; 
• They generate income from retail outlets and cafes; 
• They deliver educational programmes; 
• They derive income from image loans and the associated research; 
• They offer beneficial memberships; 
• They hire out facilities; plus 
• They facilitate film and documentary shoots; and 
• Often, they have become expert and enterprising fundraisers for a diversity of projects.

Museums have typically become experts in running programs on lean budgets. They typically work with volunteers effectively and collaboratively. Moreover, typically they can be relied upon to understand the environmental impacts of their activities and to have done pioneering work on energy saving etc.

When museums have a strategic and strong sense of why they exist – their purpose for being –  they can deliver on the above. Increasingly, museums can adapt, typically out of necessity, to create activities and income streams that match their raison detre and aims as well as complying with the core values of their publicly stated purpose for being. 

 The ‘social capital’ that is generated via their work and the social benefit they deliver epitomises financial, social and environmental sustainability. 

Many musingplaces embrace sustainability in its wider context by working with local supply chains and developing proactive environmental practices that parallel their strong ethical culture. They are typically ideal driven by, and are exemplars for other local enterprises – sometimes in partnership with them. 

Altogether this adds value to the operation and the communities that support them. 

All this is complex product development and social enterprise brand management at its best. 

It is clear that museum business/enterprise models are characterised by: 

• The type of innovation they are engaged with; 
• Their diversity and strength that in turn ensures financial sustainability; and 
• The effective social responsibility they epitomise.  

THE ENTERPRISE MODEL AND SUSTAINABILITY

People no longer trust banks, they have lost faith in hollow commercial brands and they are tiring of shallow poor quality public services. Increasingly, there is a gap that is opening up between people's time and money and what they reasonably and rightly expect in return. 

When musingplaces operate as social cum community enterprises ‘consumer frustration’ tends to diminish. Musingplaces are where we expect people to find quality and a depth of experience. They should be places where people are encouraged, respected and challenged. 

The musingplace experience is to do with well being, tranquillity and enrichment. Potentially they are enterprises that offer value for money and/or a return on investment. Public affection towards museums can be an extraordinary business phenomenon and one that increasingly few businesses in other sectors enjoy with their customers. 

The musingplace business cum enterprise model is increasingly based upon sustainability. Similarly, it is a model that is often a classic exemplar of the success early adoption of the community cum social enterprise model can deliver. Interestingly, as cultural institutions, museums are among the earliest pioneers of the enterprise model as the alternative to the cost centre based on the MICAWBERprinciple as they reimagined themselves as something other than an 'arm of government' and as being accountable to governments' constituencies. 

Indeed, it is feasible that among musingplace products and services they might well be offering 'social enterprise business advice' within their range of products and services. 

LOOKING AHEAD  

If musingplaces learn the language of community based social enterprise they can: 

• Enter the debate surrounding sustainability from the high ground; 
• Access the support offered to social enterprises; and 
• Address business and planning questions more effectively. 

Musingplace will get more value from advisors, consultants and Trustees when they can clearly articulate their purpose, their enterprise cum business model and the operation’s relationship with sustainability and the social enterprise model.

Musingplace managements need not be alarmed at unfamiliar terms. Very often they are the names for activities or models that musingplaces are already implementing and embracing – and increasingly out of necessity. 

OPEN LETTER: QVMAG TRUSTEESHIP & GOVERNANCE

Dear Trustees of the Queen Victoria Museum & Art Gallery,

<sub>I am writing to do two things.  Firstly, to congratulate you on your election or re-election to Launceston City Council  (LCC) and secondly, to draw your attention to the fact that as a consequence of your being elected to Council, you are also by default functionally a member of the QVMAG’s ‘Board of Trustees’. This is rarely overtly acknowledged, indeed there is a history at LCC where Aldermen’s QVMAG Trustee role has been downplayed – trivialised even – and the Local Govt. Act 1993 is unhelpfully ambiguous. 

Nevertheless, as  LCC Aldermen you are a member of the only body that is directly accountable to the rate and tax payers who provide almost all the funding the QVMAG relies upon. Furthermore, the QVMAG was endowed to the "Mayor, Aldermen & Citizens of Launceston" in 1895 – See online here</sub>

I imagine that the newly elected Aldermen among you may not have understood that you would be, functionally, a QVMAG Trustee when you decided to stand for election as an LCC Alderman. Arguably, in any practical sense based on the circumstantial evidence, neither did your predecessors consider this prospect – and it has been so for decades. Interestingly, QVMAG agenda items on LCC agendas have been notoriously missing for almost two decades and only appearing in crisis circumstances.

_{Put simply, as an Alderman/Trustee you, in concert with your fellow Aldermen/Trustees,} are unambiguously accountable for determining what the QVMAG does, why it does it and when it does it. Trustees need to do this in order that its management can effectively determine who does these things and how they go about it. Civic Administration 101!

Likewise, as a Trustee you, in concert with other Aldermen/Trustees, determine the institution's policies (all of them!) and by extension, management's clear role is to put your determinations into action and deliver on the policies you as Trustees put in place. 

Most importantly, as Trustees your most onerous role is to secure the funding the QVMAG needs to survive, operate its programs, conduct its research, build upon its collections and provide/maintain its infrastructure. There is no escaping this function as in the end it falls to you, in your Trustee role, to ensure that the institution is financially viable and sustainable. 

_{The separation of powers between governance and management} in civic administration is necessary in order for you, as Aldermen/Trustees, to:

• Be truly accountable to your constituency, funding agencies, donors and sponsors; and 
• Make management functionally accountable to you as QVMAG Trustees; and
• Oversight the delivery of the expected and predetermined outcomes set down by you in your role as the QVMAG's Board of Trustees; in order that you can
• Ensure that QVMAG's services and programs can be delivered to your constituency as planned.

<sub>All this falls to you because you are a member of the only body that currently has a governance function – policy determination powers – relative to the QVMAG. 

The first role of such a body is the appointment of the institution’s CEO or Director and consequently monitoring her/his performance. For whatever reason, in this case the practicality of this role has been devolved (informally?) to the General Manager in respect to the QVMAG  – and there have been flow-on consequences over time. 

There is an urgent need to proactively re-examine the situation the QVMAG finds itself in and the time is now! Moreover, given the QVMAG's multi-million dollar call on the LCC's budget, there is an urgent need for Aldermen, as the QVMAG's Trustees, to closely examine their roles as the QVMAG's governing body and the consequences of that – intended and unintended.

If you find your circumstances in regard to your 'QVMAG trusteeship role' either unclear, unacceptable or too onerous you may wish to have your situation clarified by the relevant State Govt. Ministers.  They would be:</sub>

The Minister for Local Govt. 

_{Peter Gutwein: peter – gutwein@dpac.tas.gov.au}  

The Minister for The Arts 

Dr Vanessa Goodwin MLC – vanessa.goodwin@parliament.tas.gov.au

_{I have prepared a report, attached, to put what I am putting to you here in perspective and to provide some context. I and the QVMAG's Community of Ownership & Interest look forward to your responses – collectively and individually.}

_{Yours sincerely,}
Ray Norman

Ray Norman JTC (Syd Tech.), CA (National Art School Syd.), MA (Research) Monash Melb.

Independent Researcher, Designermaker & Cultural Geographer

Director & Project Coordinator (Tas) nudgebah institute

Foundation Member (Resigned) QVMAG Museum Governance Advisory Board

“A body of men holding themselves accountable to nobody ought not to be trusted by anybody.” 
Thomas Paine

REPORT TO LCC ALDERMEN: QVMAG GOVERNANCE

     STATUS: 

• Independent Unsolicited Research Report

     METHODOLOGY: 

• Action research supported by 
• Personal communications; and 
• Internet searches.

CONTEXT

Best practice demands that the roles that fall to LCC Aldermen as Queen Victoria Museum & Art Gallery Trustees are well recognised nationally and internationally albeit that Aldermen have typically not been apprised of their function as Trustees upon their election to Council. These functions are those that determine and underpin the institution’s purpose and reason for being and by extension the following policy sets:

•  Identity policies – securing the community of ownership & interest’s support for its purpose for being and appreciation for the institution’s mission, mandate and vision;
• Financial management policies – securing funds for the institution’s recurrent costs, the application for and the securing of grants for program delivery and research, the securing of funds for capital development and the securing of funds for the acquisition of collection material.
• Progress policies – setting the rate of progress the institution takes in fulfilling its purpose and mission, meeting its objectives and reaching the institution’s objectives.
• Operational policies – the guiding principles relevant to staffing, board self-governance, regulations, advice mechanisms, interpretation personnel qualifications and providing continuity for managing and implementing the institution’s affairs and long term direction;
•  Strategic Planning – setting place short and long term strategic plans that establish the institution’s goals, guiding principles and the benchmarks against which performance will be measured and when;
• Promotion policies – setting in place the guiding principles for a promotional and marketing plan that identifies the institution’s Community of Ownership & Interest (COI) and target audiences;
• Research policies – setting in place the institution's guiding principles for research with expected outcomes, ethical standards and benchmarks clearly articulated;
• Exhibition & publication policies – the mandate, guiding principles and priorities for the institution’s program delivery and publications;
• Education & training policies – the mandate and guiding principles to engage in education and training programs plus related activities;
• Acquisition and accession policies – the guiding principles relevant to the collections’ objectives and rationale, collection strategies, collecting priorities;
• Deaccession policy – the guiding principles relevant to the identification and evaluation of material to be deaccessed and removed from the institution's collection, the deaccession processes and the methodologies to be used;
• Conservation policies – the guiding principles relevant to priorities, risk management, security, personnel qualifications relevant to conservation;
• Code of ethics – the adoption of a code of ethics based upon national and international codes for research that involves humans and the handling of human material, cultural heritage material plus animal and plant material.

NOTE: It is important to know that:

• Currently there are no policy documents for the QVMAG that are openly available to the public except for a natural history destructive sampling policy     – and it is a publicly funded institution that needs to be transparent and accountable to its constituencies;

• None of the policy guidelines that the institution relies upon currently have been formally presented to, or have been formally discussed and endorsed by a meeting of LCC Aldermen/Trustees except in the most  cursory way. Thus, in this way policy determination has been functionally devolved to management. (Pers. Com – Past Aldermen)

• Notably, there is currently no Collections Acquisitions/Accession Policy or Deaccession Policy except for a draft for a combined policy that has been in re-draft for 15 months and well past their designated review date. Furthermore, the redraft, and the policies it replaces, reflects antiquated 20th understanding and sensibilities plus less than best practices from a security perspective. By extension,this situation has inherent risks.

All this is a serious situation and especially so in regard to the institution's accountability to its funding agencies, sponsors, donors and its constituency – its Community of Ownership & Interest (COI).

_{In short, to be effective and accountable as Trustees Aldermen} are essentially required to be:

• Familiar with, and have a good working knowledge of, the institution’s operation; and
• Fully cognisant of the institution’s purpose for being, mission and constitution/charter.

_{These things are important in order that Trustees can be truly ‘accountable’ to the institution’s, funding agencies, donors, sponsors and the institution’s COI that includes stakeholders and others who have collectively entrusted the QVMAG, thus its Trustees, with their cultural property. This 'trust' has been informally passed on to management.} 

Debatably, the current circumstances at QMAG has allowed the distinction between governance and management to become blurred. In this way the current Aldermen's predecessors have permitted the institution to grow exponentially over time – and especially so in the 2000s. Clearly current Aldermen have inherited a serious problem with a relatively long history.

_{INSTITUTIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY}

Unless the QVMAG is 'governed' and managed accountably the institution will be regulating itself, thus functionally unaccountable, and as a consequence, that exposes the institution, and its COI, to various problems and risks. 

_{In the context of Aldermanic trusteeship, the institution’s COI needs to be understood as an all-inclusive collective, or community of people, individuals and groups, who in any way have multi-layered relationships with the institution and its operation. Typically a COI will be a network of networks.}

Aldermen's QVMAG trustee function arises, as a consequence of their being elected a LCC Alderman. Being an Alderman/Trustee, demands a high level of accountability given the level of public funding currently being applied to the QVMAG as an institution and its programs over time. A brief stocktake of the institution as it currently stands is as follows:

• For the fiscal year 2013/14 the institution had an operating budget in the order of $5.5 million including grants – State Govt. & other;
• For the fiscal year 2013/14 the institution had an operating deficit after depreciation in the order of $3.7 million;
• Which translates to a subsidy per visitor in the order of $50;
• Which in turn requires an undisclosed flat-rate levy to be applied within LCC property rates of something in the order of $140 per rateable property to service the QVMAG's operating deficit – a deliberate consequence of cost-centric operational model;
• The institution holds collections estimated to be valued in the order of $230 million plus not taking into account the priceless scientific specimens, cultural objects and documents that would have a negligible realisable fiscal ‘value’ if any at all;
• The institution importantly provides employment for almost 50 full-time staff members and thus places in the region people with skills and knowledge that otherwise might not be here;
• The institution occupies and utilises infrastructure that has an estimated value something in excess of $50 million; 
• For the fiscal year 2013/14 the institution attracted almost 130,000 visitors; and
• The institution's website is increasing its utility – almost 1.3 million visits 2013/14 – but is yet to become a proactive income generator; a program delivery facility; and a 21st C rhizomic research network to lend credibility to the institution.

_{These metrics and performance indicators provide a very pertinent overview of the current scope of the operation and the cultural assets for which Aldermen have a trusteeship/governance role. More importantly they are indicative of the onerousness of Aldermen's trusteeship role and what is entrusted to the institution}.

If new Aldermen find all this somewhat daunting, surprising even, be assured that a long list of Aldermen before them have also found it so. Indeed, on the evidence, this Council's predecessors have virtually hand-balled their QVMAG governance function to management without formally delegating the appropriate authority to anyone or any accountable body. 

Indeed, contrary to international professional ethical standards the QVMAG operated without a Constitution/Charter until one was put in place alongside the Museum Governance Advisory Board – June 2011.

Apart from being inappropriate and unprofessional, operating without a Charter or Strategic Plan was delinquent and furthermore it placed the institution in an untenable situation given the cultural 'wealth' invested in it by it COI – sponsors and donors in particular.

Take all together, arguably, this has allowed a bureaucratic empire to evolve over time and to grow without any significant constraints with many unwarranted risks attached – and with some being realised at the expense of rate and taxpayers. 

All this has functionally blurred the distinction between governance and management at the QVMAG with less than desirable outcomes. Arguably, there is also an unacknowledged conflict of interest on the part of management embedded in all this. While it can be regarded as a 'convenience', it is not in accord with corporate best practice.

Debatably, in allowing this 'circumstance' to prevail and for so long, this Council's predecessors have permitted the institution to grow exponentially and beyond a sustainable level, over the past two decades. Clearly this new Council has inherited a serious problem and one with a relatively long history of looking the other way.

_{The QVMAG as an institution grew to its present size, essentially without constraints, and has arrived at its current level of acknowledged unsustainability via uncontrolled 'budget creep' – and further compounded by the cost-centric anti-entrepreneurial operational model that is currently in place. Over a decade – late 1900s > late 2000s – the institution's operating budget increased by something in the order of 300%, well in excess of CPI increases as a consequence of 'Better Cities' funding and other in-house dynamics.}

COMPARATIVE CIRCUMSTANCES

By way of contrast, The State Govt. ‘owns’ the Tasmanian Museum & Art Gallery in the way LCC advertises that it ‘owns’ the QVMAG. The TMAG is the ‘State of Tasmania’s cultural collection’, not 'Hobart's museum' as is often said in Launceston when there is a political money squabble in play. 

Importantly, in 1950 the State Govt. put in place the Museums Act 1950 that formally established that institution’s governance as being distinct from the State government, and at arm’s length, but nonetheless accountable to Govt. – the Tasmanian people & the TMAG's COI – via the institution’s stand-alone Board of Trustees. 

Starkly, nothing similar has been put in place for the QVMAG by LCC despite best practice indicating that it should. Arguably this renders LCC functionally unaccountable for the operation of the QVMAG. Moreover, despite being reminded of this over time no action has been taken to rectify the situation.

_{OPTIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES}

Arguably, the time has come when the anomalies of the QVMAG demonstrably dysfunctional governance are addressed and the consequentially compromised management needs to be addressed. 

Why? The issue of QVMAG governance needs to be regularised in order that the institution can be:

• Governed and managed accountably in accord with best practice; and
• _{Deliver outcomes and dividends (fiscal, social & cultural) commensurate with its COI’s substantial investment in the institution over time; and}
• Furthermore, meet funding agencies, sponsors, donors and the COI’s legitimate expectations of the institution in a 21st C context.

_{Clearly, as Aldermen for Tasmania’s largest Council Aldermen's QVMAG trusteeship might well be considered too onerous given the scale and scope of the QVMAG as an institution relative to other responsibilities and obligations as Aldermen need to attend to.}

 _{Current Aldermen might now proactively consider:}

1. Meeting separately as QVMAG Trustees, as does Council when it meets as a 'planning authority', and do so at least bimonthly with co-opted exofficio advisors as required, members of the QVMAG Museum Governance Advisory Board plus others with specialist domain knowledge to determine QVMAG policy and conduct ongoing reviews of the institution;
2. Delegating the QVMAG trusteeship to a stand-alone Board of Trustees accountable to the institution’s funding agencies ­– Local Govt., State Govt., Federal Govt., Research bodies et al;
3. Devolving ‘ownership’, governance and management to a regional ‘TRUST’, ‘B-Corporation’ or ‘Community Cultural Enterprise’ accountable to the region’s Local Govts. and the State Govt. plus its COI – donors, sponsors, et al.

_{Arguably, the first option here could be initiated almost immediately. In the event that plans to 'restructure' the institution might be under consideration, this action might well be an interim measure. The advantage in doing so would be that it would offer LCC time and opportunity to consider other alternatives over time while restructuring the institution's funding and regularising its policy sets.} 

_{Likewise it would have symbolic significance in that it would be a demonstration of LCC's 'willingness to change'. Furthermore, in doing this it would place Alderman/Trustees, and Council collectively, in a stronger position:}

• To be engaged with the revision and review of the institution’s Strategic and enterprise/business plans;
• To be engaged with the revision and review the institution’s operational structure relevant to the 21st C;
• To be engaged with securing research and project funding and research partnerships; and
• To negotiate future recurrent funding options with the State Govt. et al.

_{All this will be possible with the advantage of a broader advice base equipped with appropriate domain knowledge. Typically, and for good reason, Boards of Trustees are appointed not elected. The rationale for this being that this allows for the appointment of members with appropriate domain knowledge, skill sets and expertise.} 

_{Furthermore, members are:}

• Typically, head-hunted, rather than nominated or elected; and
• Ideally, not appointed because they 'represent' an organisation or interest group;

because they have the skills, experience and domain knowledge the institution will depend upon to succeed.

ADVICE MECHANISMS

In order that LCC should have access to appropriate advice relative to ‘museum governance’ – plus  museology, current cultural theory, developments in science, etc. – LCC put the QVMAG Museum Governance Advisory Board (MGAB) in place. At the same time a charter for the institution was put in place to regularise the institution. 

Unfortunately the MGAB has been more decorative than functional. Apart from initiating the now largely redundant QVMAG Strategic Plan (Feb 2013), framed
 as it was in a vacuum, the MGAB has offered almost nothing of ‘substance to governance’ since its inception. To be fair, neither has Council either asked or encouraged it to do so.

WHY? It is not because of its charter, which is adequate enough.  Arguably and sadly, it is because of the way the board was implemented and the board’s almost total disengagement with the Trustees/Aldermen to satisfy a variety of bureaucratic imperatives and an apparent imperative to, so far as possible, maintain the status quo despite there being acknowledged unsustainability.



Any future constitution/charter for an institution that evolves out of the current QVMAG operation and that is relevant to the Tamar/Esk Region will need advice in various areas – law, financial management, ethics, science, cultural theory, social history, natural history, technology, education, training, social engagement, etc. Thus disbanding such an advisory mechanism as the MGAB would be counter productive and pure folly. It simply need to function as designed.

FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS

It is arguable that the QVMAG as an institution in a 21st C context should now be re-imagined, re-constituted and re-invigorated as an institution that needs to be:

1. Rebranded in a context relevant to contemporaneous cultural sensibilities and scholarship in Tasmania and Australia;
2. Proactive in its acknowledgement of Tasmania's Aboriginal histories in context with the Island's colonial histories;
3. Proactive in its acknowledgement of, and engagement with, the institution's Communities of Ownership & Interest – definition;
4. Embracing the concept of 'Honest Histories' and Tasmania's postcolonial cultural realities;
5. A stand-alone, or arm's length, corporatised Community Cultural cum Social Enterprise that is an not-for-profit income generating enterprise;
6. A research institution supporting a network of scholars and researchers employed, associated with and auspiced by the institution working in cooperation and collaboration with other like institutions nationally and internationally;
7. A proactive 'publishing house' producing touring exhibitions, online exhibitions, books, catalogues, anthologies, printed material, etc.;
8. Part of a network of Tamar/Esk and Tasmanian musingplaces relevant to Tasmanian sensibilities and cultural tourism – specifically Asia/China friendly;
9. Embrace current understandings of cultural production and the histories attached to it relevant to the institution's 'placedness';
10. Be offering a participatory program that engaged with a broad spectrum of the community – Tasmanians & tourists alike; and
11. A cultural centre that services the Tamar/Esk Region and Tasmania.

In order to achieve the kind of change indicated here LCC will need to extend its advice base beyond the MGAB. The good news is that it can be anticipated that there are the people there (within the region and State) with appropriate domain knowledge and willing to be enlisted to the cause. Furthermore, Arts Tasmania has a track record in regard to responding to such projects.

_{To reiterate, it is now timely that the institution be reinvigorated in order to capitalise upon the community's substantial investments in the institution over time – fiscal & cultural.}